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Documents from 1989 Moscow Trilateral Commission

First source from Anatoly Chernyav,

https://chnm.gmu.edu/1989/files/download/729/fullsize

My interpretation of this document is the Soviet Union is signaling to the west via the Trilateral Commission that they are going to let go of Eastern Europe in order to give themselves a break from pressure of the West so that they could catch back up. The Soviets believed that the Trilateral Commission was onboard with this plan. The meeting was in January and at that point the Soviet Union was fully intact.

 

...It [the Trilateral Commission] is interested in everything that is going on, especially in our country.... I would emphasize two issues. First is how you—meaning we, the Soviet Union—are going to integrate into the world economy?... Second issue. They are coming to the conclusion that the biggest fights of perestroika are still ahead of us....

Kisa [Kissinger] ... asked me a direct question: How are you going to react if Eastern Europe wants to join the EC [European Community]?... They know that our friends are already knocking on the door. And we should also look at what processes are going on there now--the economic and the political--and where are they drifting.... The roads of our development will be very diverse, while we will preserve our commonality. We need a mechanism that would ensure our mutual understanding and interaction. There will be a lot of political, economic, and military-political questions.

... Comrades, we are on the eve of very serious things. Because we cannot give them [Eastern European countries] more than we are giving them now.... If we do not deal with that, there will be a split, and they will run away.

... Before it [a Trilateral Commission meeting], we should work this out--what can we give to our friends, and compare it with what the West can give them.... The peoples of those countries will ask: what about the CPSU, what kind of leash will it use to keep our countries in? They simply do not know that if they pulled this leash stronger, it would break....

...My impression from the meeting with the Trilateral Commission is the following: they understood in the West that the world needs a peaceful breathing spell--from the arms race, from the nuclear psychosis--as much as we need it. However, we need to know it all in detail in order not to make mistakes. They want to channel the processes in such a way as to limit as much as possible our influence on the world situation, they are trying to seize the initiative from us, present criteria of trust as tests: if the Soviet Union would not want to agree to something, we would act in a way to gain more points.

Anatoly Chernyav, "Mikhail Gorbachev reports on the Trilateral Commission." Making the History of 1989, #138.

Second Document: Seems to me there is a lot of subtext in this conversation hard for me to piece together exactly what they are talking about. The two concrete things I take away from this is that they set up a secret communications channel, and Gorby's words on: "Coordinate economies." In light of the thesis that the Soviets were signaling they were giving up Eastern Europe, and the looting of Russia and establishment of the Oligarchs that shortly followed this bears special interest.

"Record of Conversation between M. S. Gorbachev and H. Kissinger", January 17, 1989, Wilson Center Digital Archive, Archive of the Gorbachev Foundation, Notes of A.S. Chernyaev. Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.

Kissinger. In practical terms, as I understand, you implied to George Bush in your conversation on Governor's Island that you would like to establish a channel for a confidential exchange of ideas. He understands that on your end Anatoly Dobrynin would serve as the contact.

Gorbachev.  Yes, that's correct.

Kissinger. President Bush is very interested in this method of communication. We have not worked out a specific mechanism yet, but it is clear that [Brent] Scowcroft will be an important figure on the President's side in such a dialogue.

We are ready to begin at any time convenient for you. In the end of February the President will visit Japan with a short stop in China. Maybe the beginning of March could be a convenient moment? It would be a good opportunity if Anatoly Dobrynin could be in the United States at the time, or maybe some other way.

This confidential channel could be used without any harm to our dialogue through all other existing channels.  It will give us an opportunity to open up somewhat the course of our internal discussions of certain problems for you, so that when we introduce a proposal, you would know what ideas and goals are behind it.

George Bush would appreciate an opportunity to receive similar information from you.

[...]

Gorbachev.   Of course, the problem of coordinating our economies, the search of forms of cooperation-is a very real problem, and both sides should think about it.  However, already today, the steps we took in our foreign economic policy--the creation of legal and economic bases, strengthening guarantees for our foreign partners--should be supported on your side by a repeal of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment.  If you do not sweep it away with a broom, it would be difficult for us to enter your markets.

Kissinger.  The Jackson-Yanik Amendment was directed against me in the first place, and only then--against the Soviet Union.

I agree with you. I always thought it was wrong, I believed that your emigration policy was your country's internal affair. One cannot make external demands about it. One could, probably, discuss it with you confidentially, but without pressing any demands.

Gorbachev.  Those problems are now substantively resolved.

Kissinger. Yes.

Gorbachev. We only fight against the brain drain. As far as the dissidents are concerned, let them all go to your country.

Kissinger. I always believed that dissidents are very difficult to deal with even for those countries that receive them.

[...]

Gorbachev. We are waiting for a signal from the administration.

Kissinger.  You will hear positive statements from the President from the very beginning of his term.  An exchange of opinions, on which we agreed, could begin in the first days of March, if it is convenient for you.  Our people are ready.

I already told Anatoly Dobrynin, that I considered the first part of your UN speech exceptionally important. We should discuss how to implement those propositions in solving concrete problems. If we could do that, we would be able to harmonize our

policy and to improve our bilateral cooperation.

As far as the mechanism of such communication, Anatoly Dobrynin already has Scowcroft's direct personal number, and on my part, I could help establish initial contact, so that it doesn't have to go through the apparatus.

Gorbachev.  I would also like you to tell President Bush that I appreciate his letter, and the fact that he sent it at such an early stage, even before his inauguration.  We assign special importance to contacts and to confidential exchange of opinions.

Please give my regards to President Bush, and tell him that he can count not only on understanding, but also on cooperation on my part. I think that in the context of this conversation, which I would also ask you to pass on to him, it would be clear to him what meaning I am putting in these words.

I want to also add that the Wilson Center Digital Archive is a really good research site, they have 15,000 or so original documents like these. Also they have a new web style flow chart maker which I have been unable to try out because I don't have basic software on my computer lol. But if anyone does they should give it a spin and post the results!

Home Page | Wilson Center Digital Archive

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Did a little more digging and came across this: "Report by S. Goncharov for the Russian Leadership on the Question of the Current Situation in Relations between Russia and China (Excerpt)", September 1991, Wilson Center Digital Archive, GARF: fond 10026, opis 4, delo 2805.

Document sheds light on Russian strategy to prevent freedom movements in Russia. Russia has basically adopted lessons learned from Tiannamen Square. China in full support.

One of the most important, although underestimated, consequences of the suppression of the coup for the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and Russia will undoubtedly be serious changes in the relations with the PRC. One imagines that at the present it is extremely necessary to urgently analyze the situation that has unfolded and, on this basis, to take measures, which would prevent sharp deterioration of relations with this country. This memorandum makes an attempt to answer several questions, which arise in this connection, grouping them in several main categories. First and foremost one must say something here about the attitude of the Chinese towards the coup, and towards its suppression.

 

It has now become known that the putschists realized perfectly well that the possibility of severe deterioration of the international situation as a result of their actions and, moreover, consciously strove towards provoking a confrontation with the USA and other Western states. There is reliable information that the plotters, evidently, planned to accomplish strategic rapprochement with the PRC as one of the bases of their foreign policy.

 

In this respect, one finds quite informative the content of negotiations between [Minister of Defense Dmitrii] Yazov, [Chief of the General Staff Mikhail] Moiseev, and the Chief of the General Staff of the PLAC[hina] Chi Haotian, which took place in Moscow just over a week before the coup. According to trustworthy Chinese sources, during the negotiations the Soviet military leaders repeatedly declared their wholly positive attitude towards the Chinese “experience” of military suppression of the democracy movement and spoke about their own resolve to apply military force “for the prevention of chaos in the country.” The leaders of the Chinese delegation drew the unequivocal conclusion that the Soviet leaders would soon “undertake decisive measures.” After their return to Beijing, these conclusions were undoubtedly reported to the leadership of the PRC and for the leaders of that country the coup, evidently, did not become a surprise. It is also known that during another set of talks between the militaries of the two countries, which took place this summer, the Chinese side declared that it would support Soviet colleagues if they used force “to impose order.”

 

One is also alerted to the fact that during Hao Chitian’s visit, for the first time since the restoration of military ties between the two countries, an agreement was reached about cooperation in “increasing the military spirit of the PLA.” This fact is extremely important, for it signified the establishment of an ideological foundation under military cooperation, the core of which were supposed to be anti-imperialism and “commitment to socialist ideals.” Thus a basis was being created so that in the future one could move towards strategic cooperation or even to some variant of a quasi-alliance.

 

[…]

 

It is known that during the days of the coup the PRC Ambassador in Moscow met with its leaders (according to some information – with [Gennady] Yanaev). One still needs to clarify the details of this episode, because there is information that the Ambassador agreed to this meeting only after being persuaded by responsible officials of the Foreign Ministry of the USSR. It looks like the Ambassador had instructions from Beijing not to show particular activism, and to observe the development of events…

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