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The ideological platform of the Russian Federation Communist Party based on Alexander Dugin’s 1992 article 'The tragedy of Russian Communism'

The tragedy of Russian communism

This article was first published in the newspaper "Soviet Russia" in 1992 under the pseudonym Leonid Okhotin and later became the basis of the ideological platform of the revived CPRF Gennady Zyuganov.

A. Dugin

May 08, 1992

I. 10 fatal mistakes.The catastrophe, the collapse of the party and the complete rejection of socialism by the country cannot be attributed solely to the betrayal of "agents of influence" in the highest echelons of the Communist Party. There were also internal, ideological reasons for the defeat. Without their analysis, the revival of the party, the revival of the social justice regime in the country is impossible. The restored party should not be purely "restorative", "nostalgic" and "archaic". It must clearly realize the complete inadequacy of some of its previous ideological, political and geopolitical positions. Let's try to highlight the fundamental reasons that led to the crisis and collapse of not only the socialist system, but also the great Eurasian power.

1) The KP could not answer the challenge of History. This means that the ideologues of the party (starting from some point) could not or did not want to give a proper ideological and philosophical response to the changing situation in the world, could not or did not want to take into account the historical experience of the party itself, could not or did not want to go beyond archaic dogmatism, which has long ceased to correspond to the socio-political reality. The origins of the "fall asleep" of party thought should be sought in Khrushchev's times, when at the philosophical level the communist philosophy of Hegelian (and therefore state and centralist) orientation was gradually replaced by Kantianism under the guise of Marxism, which led to the dominance of the individualist, anti-collectivist and anti-state approach. Under Brezhnev, there was not a single party thinker or ideologist at all. By the time of perestroika, no communist, except for dissidents who left for the West (for example, Zinoviev), could explain the ideological essence of his views separately and coherently. Yeltsin, who chickled in America at the "vague chimera of communism", giggled at his own ignorance, at his ideological ignorance.

2) The Communist Party failed to ideologically formalize the fact of its internal transformation into a national-oriented party. The transformation of the Communist Party of Ukraine in the 1930s from the World Revolution Party into the Party of the Great Eurasian State was not reflected in the party doctrine. National-Bolshevism, which existed and flourished in practice, did not have any dogmatic expressions in ideology. This, in particular, allowed the enemies of the country to accuse the communists of the "sin of internationalism", which had not existed in practice for many years.

3) Since Khrushchev's times, the Communist Party began to actively use "humanist" and "democratic" rhetoric, incompatible with the socialist ideology, of which the party was de facto, the carrier. This gave rise to doublethink and hypocry in culture, ideology and political education of the people. Instead of Stalinist realism (sometimes cynical and cruel, but always quite frank), an atmosphere of falseness, corruption and latent orientation to the West reigned in society. This is how the gradual surrender of ideological positions to the enemy took place.

4) The KP made foreign policy and geopolitics issues the property of the classified structures of the KGB, the General Staff and the Special Departments, in the bosom of which destructive, subversive, liquidatory geopolitical projects could mature (and matured matured) for a long time, the meaning of which, precisely due to secrecy, was not clear for a long time to either the people or the communists. This attitude towards ordinary communists and the people as morons, from whom it is necessary to hide geopolitical projects and the logic of international politics, led to the alienation of the party from the nation. By the way, such an attitude was never characteristic of early communists until Stalin, who clearly and unambiguously told the people who was a friend and who was an enemy, and explained why. Although the international reality could change, nevertheless, its general principles in general terms were then clear to everyone.

5) The CP, following the "subversive" projects of the extremist Khrushchev, failed to stop the process of "deprivatization" and pressure on small producers, although since the late 1950s it was obvious that the introduction of certain elements of small private (or even more so community, cooperative) production is inevitable. Thus, it was the KP that contributed to the creation of shadow structures of the economy, which turned from visible and subject to control into clan mafia organizations. With the weakening of control from above and corruption of law enforcement agencies, this could not but lead to economic collapse. Archaism in the socialist economy not only did not contribute to its stability, but inevitably led to its collapse.

6) KP, having abandoned the natural for the East "anthropological pessimism" (i.e. the attitude towards man as an imperfect being and in need of correction by socio-religious structures), characteristic of all traditional societies of Eastern Eurasia, both theocratic and secular, changed the logic of the state and social history of Russian society. Brezhnevsky's slogan "everything for man, everything in the name of man" was not only false, but also treacherous in relation to the centuries-old social fases of Russia. In the political context of the modern world and in the conventions of modern political sjargon today it is obvious to everyone that the slogan "man" opposes the slogan "people"; the protection of "human rights" is always based on the infringement of the "rights of the people", and vice versa, the "rights of the people" cannot be respected without a certain infringement and restriction of individual human freedom. Even if we distract from the extent to which "rights" and "freedoms" correspond to reality, the most important thing remains the fundamental anthropological approach underlying social ideology. "Humanism" and "anthropological optimism" inherent in the West and Western society are completely unacceptable to the society of the East. To think differently is to fall into historical utopia and unreasonable unreal abstraction. To think differently means to deny the whole history of the East and its social features.

7) The Communist Party, gravitating internally towards a special form of popular religiosity, communal ethics and Eurasian statehood, continued to insist on atheism, proletarian class orientation and internationalism, which gave rise to a deep contradiction between reality and slogans. The real alliance of the party elite with the church hierarchy remained a secret to society behind the seven seals until the moment when the discovery of this fact could only lead to the discrediting of the Church. This, in particular, turned many potential allies and sincerely believing people away from both communism and the Russian Orthodox Church, pushing some to sectarianism and schism (the Orthodox Church, the Russian Orthodox Church abroad, etc.), and others to solidarity with Russophobic anti-patriotic and anti-socialist religious movements oriented towards the geopolitical and ideological West. The moral practiced in the socialist state gradually, after the eschatological excesses of early communism, came into line with national traditional norms. There is practically nothing specific and abstract "communist" left in it. On the contrary, in many respects the moral atmosphere of socialism was more archaic (in a positive sense) and more "religious" than the capitalist period of the nominally monarchical and Orthodox Russian State before the revolution. And finally, from a class point of view, the Party was not so much proletarian as national, and the Messianic Marxist thesis about the proletariat turned into a glorification of the ethics of Labor, Creation and Service to the Fatherland, equally applicable to all segments of the population. The dogmas of the party formation, which affirmed its atheism, "proletarianism" and special communist morality, did not reflect the real traditionally ethical, religious and national (supra-class) character of the party at all.

8) The KP, masking the principle of elitism embedded in the system of party selection of managerial personnel and ashamed to openly recognize the practice of high-quality selection for leadership positions, gave rise to family and corruption in the party hierarchy. The principle of selecting the best was replaced by the principle of selecting the most devoted or even the most compromised. Among other things, many talented and capable elite cadres were thrown into the dissident camp, repressed or simply squandered their talent on the lower floors of the social, political and hardware hierarchy.

9) The KP made all ideological and intellectual activities an occupation of an unknown shadow reference, which provided nominal rulers with projects, the logic of constructions of which remained a secret for the highest functionaries themselves. In a critical situation of confrontation, the party's ideology was in the hands of people who were absolutely incompetent to respond to any counterargument of essentially anti-socialist elements. Lenin and Stalin were well versed in the subtleties of world history and diplomatic intricacies. Both of them were also clearly aware (this does not mean that they always spoke openly) of the fundamental ontological, historical and social principles on which the ideology of their party was based. In this situation, the party can only nominate honest state officials-economic workers or hysterical cliques.

10) The KP constantly clung to the "idea of one-way progress" that had outlived itself and exposed today as a harmful utopia, thereby denying the reality of the cyclicalism of history. In this regard, the question of building socialism in one country and Stalin's concept of the socialist state marked the rejection of the orthodox Marxist and especially vividly manifested in Trotsky's concept of Permanent Revolution, which believed that history was moving only in one direction. Stalin recognized de facto that the social history of states is a cyclical process, and it was on this that the geopolitical continuity of the USSR and the Great Russian Empire was based. Marx, and later Trotsky, insisted on the dying of the state. Stalin strengthened, elevated and made the Russian State powerful and huge, not only without bringing its end closer, but also laying the foundation for the Eurasian State, far beyond the territories of the Russian Empire in the most favorable times. "Progress" and the superstitions associated with it were revived again in the time of Khrushchev. This fact alone indicates the vice and "subversive nature" of this malicious idea, which is a relic of the naive mechanistic theories of the Enlightenment era, most of which have long been successfully refuted by science. Gathering all these points together, we can say that the main fundamental mistake of the KP is that it chose the path of ideological compromise with a completely alien "bourgeois-humanistic" ideology and phraseology and categorically refused to call things by their names. The KP was one, but it pretended to be something completely different. It was the Eurasian Party of a rigid Eastern type, which put in practice the interests of the nation, the people above the interests of the private individual, the individual. It was the Party of the East and Social Justice, which opposed the imperialist interests of the West, and primarily the United States, and the Anglo-Saxon world as a whole. It was a Party that defended the primacy of community interests and collective ethics over the selfishness of the market "economic man" of capitalism. It was a Party that harshly pursued the geopolitical interests of Russia, expanded and strengthened the Great State, sacrificing its blood, its life, its best people for this. Gradually, from the original Marxism and faceless proletarian internationalism, the Party moved to the National Bolshevik archetype, which embodied the modern energies of Russian ancient history and Russian social traditions. "Internationalism" (like cosmopolitanism) of the first Bolsheviks gradually turned into Russian Eurasian imperial super-nationalism, and Marx's universalist utopias became an expression of the desire of a particular great nation and a particular state for power, strength and prosperity. As for the price paid for the construction of the most powerful power, despite its cruelty and immomority, we must not forget that all the Great requires giant sacrifices, blood, suffering, feats and terrible, inhuman efforts. This is a historical constant. Perhaps the most fatal for the Party turned out to be its Russian nature, which hardly gets along with analytical thinking and gravitates, on the contrary, towards intuitive knowledge. If it were not for this "distrust of the human, too human mind" (fraught with both brilliant metaphysical insights and terrible failures on the verge of dementia), the Party would have long recognized the pernital poison of the "bourgeois-humanistic" ideology that corroded the political and ideological life of Soviet society from the inside, starting with the notorious and terrible in its consequences Khrushchev's rule.

II. 10 amendments that will be saving.

In the current conditions of the temporary victory of the anti-people factor in the state and the ephemeral triumph of the anti-national ideology, despite all the many political, cultural and ideological forces of the people's, national opposition - from neo-monarchists to neo-communists, only the restored Communist Party has real chances for a political, ideological and geopolitical victory, despite all its discrediting in the eyes of public opinion. This public opinion is the product of a very external mental hypnosis, which, although it can act for some time, but still its power can never and under no circumstances compare with the strength of the archetypes of the collective unconscious nation. But it is the collective unconscious that is the body by which the people "think", which they feel and in agreement with which they make historically decisive decisions. Hypnosis of "bourgeois-democratic" demagogues has the strongest effect on minor layers of residents of large cities, which are most often dominated by elements of cultural, national or religious mixing. It is such people who are endowed with the weakest contact with the collective unconscious, which, in fact, is a sign of deep mental deviation. It would not be an exaggeration to say that in our Eurasian, Russian conditions, a "democrat" can be either a foreigner or a mentally ill man. Therefore, in the event of the revival of the former Communist Party as the force that it was not in words, but in practice, the people will certainly see in it the embodiment of their own ideological need, their own voice. But for this Renaissance, it is necessary to take into account the causes of the KP disaster. The restored Party should become the vanguard in the battle for the establishment of National, Social and Geopolitical Justice throughout the Soviet Union, grossly violated by destructive, subversive processes unleashed by anti-socialist, Russophobic, anti-patriotic imperialist forces through their "agents of influence" in the USSR from Khrushchev to Gorbachev. The restored party must correct hypocritical and demagogic slogans that do not correspond to its essence in the slightest degree. Namely, we need to discard:

1) dogmatism, ideological archaism and nostalgic restorationism (it is necessary to boldly look in the face of History);

2) a superficial and formal approach to solving national problems (it is necessary to provide all Soviet peoples with maximum cultural, religious, economic, industrial, trade and linguistic autonomy, limiting only military, political and geopolitical autonomy);

3) demagogic "humanism" and "democracy" (approving in its place the concept of "anagogic totalitarianism", i.e. a hierarchical and centralized society, embodying in its floors the path of ethical, spiritual and qualitative improvement);

4) secrecy in relation to the most important geopolitical, diplomatic and international projects (which will allow the people to follow and trust with their intuition the course of the political leadership in radical historical issues (for example, if the Afghan war had not been a secret war, if its geopolitical, strategic and anti-imperialist goals had been explained to the nation, it would have been won a long time ago));

5) pseudo-socialist dogmatism regarding small cooperative and even private producers and owners, as well as various forms of corporate and artel management (which will allow market elements to exist under the control of economic justice);

6) the rhetoric of "human rights" and "anthropological optimism" of slogans (since the human being, especially the human being of our cyclical period, certainly needs a radical and rigid "correction" both in the ethical and religious spheres (this is not contradicted by any religion);

7) atheism and anti-religious rhetoric (covering the possibility of a spiritual perspective in the bosom of "anagogic totalitarianism" and depriving all Eurasian imperiality of the highest, transcendental perspective);

8) egalitarianism and the idea of qualitative individual equality of people (since people can be equal and should be equal only in the face of some supreme superhuman Principle - in the face of God, History, Nation, State, Community, Truth, etc.) ;

9) delegation of the most important ideological, political and geopolitical decisions to the shadow referency (and therefore, it is necessary to treat one's people as a people who thinks, understands and makes decisions, i.e. as a people actively involved in the governance of the state and fully participates in the conscious and strong-willed creation of History);

10) "dogma of progress" (which does not stand up to any test by scientific data and is a simple relic of naive "enlightenmental optimism" of the XVIII - XIX centuries).

The party, of course, must carry out a powerful purge in its ranks to swee out all the "subversive" elements on which lies a stain of betrayal, liquidation, collaborationism with the "bourgeois-democratic" clique of the provisional occupation government, in the service of the imperialist bankocracy. The party must establish its doctrinal continuity of the National-Bolshevik Ideology, which was most fully developed by the Russian Smenovevekhovites (Ustrialov and others), Eurasians (Trubetskoy, Savitsky, Vernadsky, etc.) and German conservative revolutionaries (from Arthur Muller van den Broek to early Ernst Jünger, Ernst von Zalomon and Ernst Nikisch). The party should strive for a complete seizure of power in the USSR, and further for the formation of an ideological continental structure, the Party of the Eurasian East, i.e. to create a New Continental Bloc on its basis, which can only provide real strategic and environmental security within Europe and Asia in the modern world. The geopolitical prospects of the Party should be coordinated with the concept of the European national revolutionary Jean Tiriard with his prophetic thesis about the historical need to create a single "Euro-Soviet Empire from Vladivostok to Dublin" in the future. The party must necessarily be patriotically oriented. Moreover, it must integrate on a free and voluntary basis all the ideological flanks of the patriotic movement - from patriots-monarchists to patriots-democrats. This integration is necessary not only from the point of view of the tactical unification of all national forces, but as a test stone of authentic, effective and adequate ideological synthesis, which forms the basis of the revived Party. Sectarianism, pseudo-orthodoxy, personal ambitions and dogmatism in our situation are synonymous with betrayal of the historical interests of the people and the state. The party should not be a product of the mechanical addition of all existing movements and parties of patriotic orientation, it should become a spiritual and intellectual integration, a clear crystal expression of the people's will, based on the deep instincts of our imperial ethnos - from its metaphysical and religious self-manifestation to the voice of the archetypes of the collective unconscious. If all the above conditions are met, and all the necessary conclusions are drawn, the revived Party not only has a chance to win, it is doomed to Victory, despite all the temporary gloating gloating "democratic" scum, half-blooded scum of big cities, lyzobard lumpens of the "End of History", hastily announced by the rejoiced builders of the New World Order. Let our bloody banner be a constant threat to them.