Moshe Koenigstein
December 2011
The news of the release of Israeli corporal Gilad Shalit, who was kidnapped by terrorists five years ago in exchange for 1,027 Palestinian prisoners (see Anna Isakova’s material in this issue of Lechaim), split Israeli society into “Russian” Israel and “Israeli” Israel. If in “greater” Israel the government’s decision on the exchange is supported - with all the reservations - by up to 80%, then on the “Russian street” the majority is strongly against it. We asked Israeli sociologist Moshe Kenigstein, who has long been analyzing the mentality and sentiments of Russian-speaking Israelis, to comment on this phenomenon.
Of course, the reality is much more complex than the stereotypical opinion about “Russian” Israelis. Like any social group, the Russian-speaking community is internally differentiated according to a variety of indicators. On the other hand, it is obvious that this group has a special position on many issues in Israeli life. So, if the overwhelming majority of non-Russian-speaking Israelis, despite all the awareness of the traumatic nature of the Shalit deal, still generally supported it and this attitude, in general, became the subject of public consensus, then on the “Russian street” about two-thirds speak out against it, perceiving this the exchange as a capitulation of the government, army, intelligence services, a sign of the psychological and moral weakness of Israeli society.
There are several reasons for this. Firstly, the Israelis have already experienced similar exchanges - remember, for example, the so-called “Jibril deal” of 1985. For those who came to Israel relatively recently, the Shalit deal is unusual and unacceptable.
Secondly, in Israel, during the entire five years that Shalit was in captivity, there was an unprecedented campaign for his release: speeches by political leaders, media publications, demonstrations, tent cities, letters, telephone calls. Moreover, it has spilled out beyond the borders of Israel, including because Shalit has French citizenship along with Israeli citizenship. And this campaign had a strong influence both on public opinion and on the government and the Knesset. In addition, Shalit’s parents, who selflessly fought for the return of their son, enjoyed emotional support. The image of the corporal himself, who looked more like an intelligent boy than a courageous fighter, also evoked mass sympathy.
And all this influenced the Hebrew-speaking public to a much greater extent than the Russian-speaking one. Most “Russians” focus on Russian-language media. And they took a different position, like influential public opinion leaders on the “Russian street,” in particular Avigdor Lieberman, whose party is supported by about 50% of Russian-speaking voters.
Yes, Lieberman voted against this deal, yes, there was practically no rush campaign in the Russian-language media demanding the release of Shalit by any means. But this, of course, does not mean that the “Russians” were against the soldier’s return from captivity. Rather, what turned out to be more significant for them was the feeling of the colossal failure of the army, intelligence, the abnormality of the situation, when the security forces admit their helplessness, and public organizations and parents sitting in a tent near the prime minister’s residence are engaged in the liberation of the soldier.
In fact, this is a fragment of a long process of declining public trust in the country's leadership. Israeli politics, after the departure of Rabin and Sharon, is generally experiencing a catastrophic degradation of the elite and a lack of leadership. At the same time, the mechanisms for updating elites are working poorly, social and political elevators are clogged with blood clots. Why has the left side of the Israeli political spectrum failed? This is in many ways not an ideological, but, so to speak, “personal” story; there is simply no one to vote for. As soon as a more or less bright figure appeared in Labor - former journalist Sheli Yachimovich, who headed the party this year - the left again had an electoral perspective. On the right, at least there is such a bright politician as Lieberman...
Why do “Russian” Israelis react to this situation differently than the rest of the country? The fact is that, on the one hand, they are part of Israeli society, and a part that is quite firmly integrated into it. The bulk of Russian-speaking repatriates came here in the early or mid-1990s; of course, in 15–20 years they grew into a new life. There is a group of people who live quite isolated, do not know the language, and do not particularly follow social life, but there are not many of them. So, when the Hebrew-language media explain the peculiarity of the position of the “Russians” by their isolation, lack of sufficient information about what is happening, and talk about the “Russian ghetto,” this is a journalistic template that has little in common with reality.
On the other hand, “Russians” participate little in the activities of public organizations. According to research, less than 5% of adult Russian-speaking Israelis take part in the actions of political parties and public organizations - not just support, but actually take part. On the one hand, this is probably bad, since it indicates the underdevelopment of civic consciousness, etc. But another conclusion can be drawn: thanks to this lack of involvement, the “Russians” manage to maintain greater independence, their opinion is less influenced by various kinds of media campaigns. And this is rather a positive factor, because Hebrew-language media often use unreliable and unbalanced information and resort to dubious methods of putting pressure on public opinion.
There is one more point in this whole story that cannot be ignored. After Shalit’s release, frankly inhumane statements began to appear on Russian-language blogs and forums. The authors are perplexed why they make a hero out of a person who was captured without resistance, claim that he was obliged to die, but not surrender, that his parents had no right to demand his release, knowing what price the state would have to pay, etc. Such characters, like any radicals, are visible, but it is known that the blogosphere and the Internet in general very inaccurately reflect the picture of society as a whole. Most “normal” people do not write comments on forums: 90% of visitors to certain sites simply read the news and articles posted there, 8–9% comment, and only 1% create content. Forum commentators are, as a rule, people with a lack of communication in real life. And this is not at all specific to the Russian-language Internet: read what they write about “Russians” on Israeli forums - this is exactly the same clinic.
The question that is being quite actively debated in connection with all this is whether this “anti-humanism” was brought from the Soviet Union or whether it arose on Israeli soil? Who are these people in the first place: former Soviet citizens or new Israelis? For me, the answer is clear: almost all assessments and opinions of Russian-speaking Israelis were formed in their new homeland. “Russians who imported the Soviet totalitarian legacy into Israel” is a journalistic stereotype that is far from reality. Not a single large group of emigrants preserves values in a conserved form for decades.
Traditionally, in the Russian-Jewish environment, education was considered the highest value. Many emigrated in order to give their children a good education. But in Israel, education quickly moved from first place on the value scale to the middle, if not the bottom, of the list. No more than half of the children from Russian-speaking Israeli families graduate from high school and receive a matriculation certificate.
What is the reason? About 60% of repatriates from the USSR came from positions requiring higher education. The social and professional structure of the Jewish population of the Soviet Union was an inverted pyramid. Unlike other national groups, less than 20% of Soviet Jews could be classified as “proletarians,” while the majority worked in science, culture, and education. But in Israel, the pyramid has turned over from the tip to the base - more than half of the “Russian” Israelis are employed in jobs that do not require higher education. Of course, after such a tectonic disruption, the views and values of this group did not remain unchanged. Everything was turned upside down - or rather, upside down.
Source: https://lechaim.ru/ARHIV/236/kenigshteyn.htm
Moshe Koenigstein
December 2011
The news of the release of Israeli corporal Gilad Shalit, who was kidnapped by terrorists five years ago in exchange for 1,027 Palestinian prisoners (see Anna Isakova’s material in this issue of Lechaim), split Israeli society into “Russian” Israel and “Israeli” Israel. If in “greater” Israel the government’s decision on the exchange is supported - with all the reservations - by up to 80%, then on the “Russian street” the majority is strongly against it. We asked Israeli sociologist Moshe Kenigstein, who has long been analyzing the mentality and sentiments of Russian-speaking Israelis, to comment on this phenomenon.
Of course, the reality is much more complex than the stereotypical opinion about “Russian” Israelis. Like any social group, the Russian-speaking community is internally differentiated according to a variety of indicators. On the other hand, it is obvious that this group has a special position on many issues in Israeli life. So, if the overwhelming majority of non-Russian-speaking Israelis, despite all the awareness of the traumatic nature of the Shalit deal, still generally supported it and this attitude, in general, became the subject of public consensus, then on the “Russian street” about two-thirds speak out against it, perceiving this the exchange as a capitulation of the government, army, intelligence services, a sign of the psychological and moral weakness of Israeli society.
There are several reasons for this. Firstly, the Israelis have already experienced similar exchanges - remember, for example, the so-called “Jibril deal” of 1985. For those who came to Israel relatively recently, the Shalit deal is unusual and unacceptable.
Secondly, in Israel, during the entire five years that Shalit was in captivity, there was an unprecedented campaign for his release: speeches by political leaders, media publications, demonstrations, tent cities, letters, telephone calls. Moreover, it has spilled out beyond the borders of Israel, including because Shalit has French citizenship along with Israeli citizenship. And this campaign had a strong influence both on public opinion and on the government and the Knesset. In addition, Shalit’s parents, who selflessly fought for the return of their son, enjoyed emotional support. The image of the corporal himself, who looked more like an intelligent boy than a courageous fighter, also evoked mass sympathy.
And all this influenced the Hebrew-speaking public to a much greater extent than the Russian-speaking one. Most “Russians” focus on Russian-language media. And they took a different position, like influential public opinion leaders on the “Russian street,” in particular Avigdor Lieberman, whose party is supported by about 50% of Russian-speaking voters.
Yes, Lieberman voted against this deal, yes, there was practically no rush campaign in the Russian-language media demanding the release of Shalit by any means. But this, of course, does not mean that the “Russians” were against the soldier’s return from captivity. Rather, what turned out to be more significant for them was the feeling of the colossal failure of the army, intelligence, the abnormality of the situation, when the security forces admit their helplessness, and public organizations and parents sitting in a tent near the prime minister’s residence are engaged in the liberation of the soldier.
In fact, this is a fragment of a long process of declining public trust in the country's leadership. Israeli politics, after the departure of Rabin and Sharon, is generally experiencing a catastrophic degradation of the elite and a lack of leadership. At the same time, the mechanisms for updating elites are working poorly, social and political elevators are clogged with blood clots. Why has the left side of the Israeli political spectrum failed? This is in many ways not an ideological, but, so to speak, “personal” story; there is simply no one to vote for. As soon as a more or less bright figure appeared in Labor - former journalist Sheli Yachimovich, who headed the party this year - the left again had an electoral perspective. On the right, at least there is such a bright politician as Lieberman...
Why do “Russian” Israelis react to this situation differently than the rest of the country? The fact is that, on the one hand, they are part of Israeli society, and a part that is quite firmly integrated into it. The bulk of Russian-speaking repatriates came here in the early or mid-1990s; of course, in 15–20 years they grew into a new life. There is a group of people who live quite isolated, do not know the language, and do not particularly follow social life, but there are not many of them. So, when the Hebrew-language media explain the peculiarity of the position of the “Russians” by their isolation, lack of sufficient information about what is happening, and talk about the “Russian ghetto,” this is a journalistic template that has little in common with reality.
On the other hand, “Russians” participate little in the activities of public organizations. According to research, less than 5% of adult Russian-speaking Israelis take part in the actions of political parties and public organizations - not just support, but actually take part. On the one hand, this is probably bad, since it indicates the underdevelopment of civic consciousness, etc. But another conclusion can be drawn: thanks to this lack of involvement, the “Russians” manage to maintain greater independence, their opinion is less influenced by various kinds of media campaigns. And this is rather a positive factor, because Hebrew-language media often use unreliable and unbalanced information and resort to dubious methods of putting pressure on public opinion.
There is one more point in this whole story that cannot be ignored. After Shalit’s release, frankly inhumane statements began to appear on Russian-language blogs and forums. The authors are perplexed why they make a hero out of a person who was captured without resistance, claim that he was obliged to die, but not surrender, that his parents had no right to demand his release, knowing what price the state would have to pay, etc. Such characters, like any radicals, are visible, but it is known that the blogosphere and the Internet in general very inaccurately reflect the picture of society as a whole. Most “normal” people do not write comments on forums: 90% of visitors to certain sites simply read the news and articles posted there, 8–9% comment, and only 1% create content. Forum commentators are, as a rule, people with a lack of communication in real life. And this is not at all specific to the Russian-language Internet: read what they write about “Russians” on Israeli forums - this is exactly the same clinic.
The question that is being quite actively debated in connection with all this is whether this “anti-humanism” was brought from the Soviet Union or whether it arose on Israeli soil? Who are these people in the first place: former Soviet citizens or new Israelis? For me, the answer is clear: almost all assessments and opinions of Russian-speaking Israelis were formed in their new homeland. “Russians who imported the Soviet totalitarian legacy into Israel” is a journalistic stereotype that is far from reality. Not a single large group of emigrants preserves values in a conserved form for decades.
Traditionally, in the Russian-Jewish environment, education was considered the highest value. Many emigrated in order to give their children a good education. But in Israel, education quickly moved from first place on the value scale to the middle, if not the bottom, of the list. No more than half of the children from Russian-speaking Israeli families graduate from high school and receive a matriculation certificate.
What is the reason? About 60% of repatriates from the USSR came from positions requiring higher education. The social and professional structure of the Jewish population of the Soviet Union was an inverted pyramid. Unlike other national groups, less than 20% of Soviet Jews could be classified as “proletarians,” while the majority worked in science, culture, and education. But in Israel, the pyramid has turned over from the tip to the base - more than half of the “Russian” Israelis are employed in jobs that do not require higher education. Of course, after such a tectonic disruption, the views and values of this group did not remain unchanged. Everything was turned upside down - or rather, upside down.
Source: https://lechaim.ru/ARHIV/236/kenigshteyn.htm
