Quote from Timothy Fitzpatrick on May 15, 2023, 12:16

Soviet Union and Israel: From Recognition to Severing Diplomatic Relations (1948–1953)

By Alexander Lokshin
May 14, 2023

The first years of relations between the Soviet Union and Israel were marked by ups and downs, expectations, hopes and disappointments.

"On the basis of natural and historical law"

On the morning of May 14, 1948, British rule in Palestine ended: the British lowered their flag in Jerusalem. And on the same day, an event occurred that the Jewish people had been waiting for 2000 years. On the fifth day of the month of Iyar 5708, the Jewish state became a reality. The leadership of the Jewish community - Yishuv - gathered in the Tel Aviv Museum for the ceremony of proclaiming the state.

In front of two hundred members of the People's Government, the National Council, rabbis, the command of the Haganah - the underground armed forces, heads of municipalities and journalists, the head of the National Council, David Ben-Gurion, read out the Declaration of Independence, consisting of 979 words in Hebrew.

On November 29, 1947, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution on the establishment of a Jewish state in Eretz-Israel <...> On this basis, we, members of the People's Council, representatives of the Jewish population in Eretz-Israel and the world Zionist movement, gathered on the day the British mandate for Eretz-Israel ended Israel, and by virtue of our natural and historical right, and on the basis of the decision of the UN General Assembly, we hereby proclaim the creation of the Jewish State in Eretz-Israel - the State of Israel <…> efforts to develop the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants <…> It will ensure freedom of religion and conscience, the right to use their native language, the right to education and culture.It will protect the holy places of all religions and will be true to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

 

The Declaration called on the sons of the Arab people "to keep the peace and participate in the construction of the state on the basis of complete civil equality." A desire was expressed to establish good neighborly relations with all states and to contribute to the development of the Middle East. "The Jewish state," Ben-Gurion said at the end of the meeting, "has been created." The Jews of Palestine and the countries of the Diaspora greeted the news of the declaration of independence with rejoicing.

Within two hours, the United States recognized the new de facto state. On May 18, immediately de jure, Israel also recognized the Soviet Union.

The decision to declare independence following the departure of the British was not an easy one. The population of the Jewish state at that time was only 650 thousand people. The chance of it surviving its birthday depended on the ability of the small community to resist the invasion of five regular Arab armies supported by a million Palestinian Arabs. After the departure of the British, the Arab invasion was to follow unambiguously. When asked by Ben-Gurion how ready the Haganah was for the decisive hour, her command replied: “Our chances are fifty-fifty. Fifty that we will win, fifty that we will be defeated. But the decision to declare independence on the initiative of Ben-Gurion was made.

On the night of May 14-15, the armies of Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Egypt and the Arab Legion of Transjordan invaded Palestine. According to forecasts, the fall of the Jewish state was to happen in a matter of days. The main hostilities in the War of Independence lasted from 15 May 1948 until the armistice on 24 February 1949. The citizens of Israel, not wanting to be "thrown into the sea", survived and won. The country lost 6,000 young Israelis, which accounted for at least 1% of the population.

“Soviet recognition was of great importance for us”

“Although we were in mortal danger, we knew that we were not alone” - these words, spoken by the first Israeli ambassador to the Soviet Union and future head of government, Golda Meir, were not an exaggeration.

In May 1947, at an emergency session of the UN General Assembly, the United States and the USSR advocated the division of Palestine into two states - Jewish and Arab. Although the attitude towards the ideology of Zionism in the Soviet leadership remained negative, the Kremlin's position on the issue of Palestine was not unequivocal. The refusal of Great Britain to satisfy the requests of US President Harry Truman and increase the quotas for the entry of Jews into Palestine provided the USSR with an opportunity to strengthen its position in the Middle East.

Pavel Sudoplatov, a senior Soviet security official, recalled:

In April 1946, Deputy Foreign Ministers Dekanozov and Vyshinsky sent a memo to the government <…> proposed to pursue a policy of favorable attitude towards the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine <…> The calculation was to strengthen the Soviet position in the Middle East and at the same time undermine the British influence in the Arab countries that resisted the emergence of a new state <...> Molotov's assistant Vetrov recounted to me the words of I. Stalin: “Let's agree with the formation of Israel. It will be like an awl in the ass for the Arab states and make them turn their backs on Britain <…> British influence will be completely undermined in Egypt, Syria, Turkey and Iraq.

Unexpectedly for many, at the May session of the UN in 1947, the Soviet representative A. Gromyko said:

The Jewish people endured exceptional disasters and sufferings in the last war <...> In the territories dominated by the Nazis, the Jews were subjected to almost complete physical extermination. The total number of the Jewish population who died at the hands of the fascist executioners is estimated at approximately 6 million people <…> It is time, not in words, but in deeds, to help these people.

On November 29, 1947, Gromyko, speaking at the UN in support of the resolution on the division of Palestine into two states, pointed to "the connection of the Jewish people with Palestine over a long historical period of time."

Moscow's decision to recognize Israel was expected: on May 18, 1948, Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov sent a telegram to Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Sharet (Shertok):

I hereby inform you that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has decided to officially recognize the State of Israel and its Provisional Government <...> The Soviet Government expresses confidence in the successful development of friendly relations between the USSR and the State of Israel.

On May 26, 1948, diplomatic relations were established between the two countries. P. I. Ershov became the first envoy of the USSR to Israel. On August 17, he presented his credentials. And on September 6, the Israeli mission began its work in Moscow. G. Meyerson (Meir) was appointed as the envoy of Israel. The Soviet Union provided military assistance to the Yishuv and Israel. Probably, since the end of 1947, in agreement with the Soviet leadership, weapons (mostly captured German) were delivered through Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. Meir noted in her memoirs:

Who knows if we would have survived had it not been for the weapons and ammunition we were able to purchase from Czechoslovakia and transport through Yugoslavia in those first dark days of the outbreak of the war? We relied heavily on the shells, machine guns and bullets that the Haganah managed to purchase in Eastern Europe ...

The US embargo on arms sales to the Middle East has forced Yishuv leaders to look for other suppliers. The issue of weapons was the most important topic of secret contacts between representatives of the Jewish Agency and Soviet diplomats in the United States. The USSR played a decisive role in creating an illegal channel for the delivery of weapons to the Jews of Palestine: they were transported by sea and by air.

Archival documents testify that before May 1948, more than 24 thousand rifles, 54 million cartridges, 5 thousand light and 200 medium machine guns, several dozen aircraft were delivered to Palestine. In August 1948, the Israeli envoy to Czechoslovakia asked to convey "the gratitude of the Israeli government and people for the support provided by the Soviet Union to the State of Israel."

Transportation of weapons continued until the beginning of 1949. In Czechoslovakia, Soviet instructors trained military specialists for Israel. Israel's support was also the Soviet consent to the departure of about 200 thousand Jews from the countries of Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union viewed Israel's armed actions as an act of legitimate self-defense. In May 1949, the Soviet delegation at the UN General Assembly supported Israel on the issue of admission to the UN.

Why, after the recognition of the State of Israel by the Soviet Union and, as it seemed to many, the “honeymoon” that had come, a break followed in their relations a few years later?

Israel was the only country with which the Soviet Union broke off diplomatic relations twice: in February 1953 and June 1967. In the first case, diplomatic relations were restored in a short time, already in July 1953. However, relations that had been severed at the end of the Six-Day War were fully restored only after almost a quarter of a century, in October 1991.

It is hardly possible to accurately determine the date or event that had a negative impact on bilateral contacts. An unpleasant surprise for the Soviet authorities was the enthusiastic reception extended to Golda Meir and other Israeli diplomats in Moscow. On October 4, they visited the Moscow Choral Synagogue and took part in the divine service on the occasion of the celebration of Rosh Hashanah, the New Year. According to a rough estimate by an official from the Council for Religious Affairs, there were up to 10,000 people in and around the synagogue. The demonstration of solidarity with Israel was perceived as anti-Soviet and hostile. Signs of deterioration in relations were the silence of the Soviet side on requests for the admission of officers of the Israel Defense Forces, the allocation of loans, the dispatch of a specialist forestry specialist, as well as the invitation of the then Deputy Foreign Minister Gromyko.

But one of the central issues in relations between the USSR and Israel was the issue of Israeli-American relations. In the early 1950s, Israeli leaders chose to cooperate with the United States and its allies. In November 1951, a note from the USSR to the Israeli government expressed concern about the US plan to create an "allied command" in the Middle East. Questions about the transfer of Russian property to the USSR and the distribution of Soviet literature in Israel also remained controversial.

The issue of Soviet Jews was also an extremely painful topic that complicated relations between countries. The irritant for the Soviet leadership was the persistence of Israel in its attempts to achieve the departure of Jews from the USSR. The Israeli Foreign Ministry insisted on giving its diplomats the opportunity to have constant contacts with the Jewish population and distribute literature about Israel among them. The Soviet government treated such requirements very negatively. The situation of Soviet Jews and possible actions that could influence the solution of the issue of their emigration were a constant topic of discussion in the Supreme Soviet and the Foreign Ministry.

In a certificate dated April 19, 1950, entitled "Relationship of the USSR to the State of Israel", it was noted:

The Israeli mission in Moscow launched illegal activities, encouraging Soviet Jews <…> to leave for Israel <…> the mission undertook the publication of a bulletin with Zionist propaganda <…> This activity was stopped only after the intervention of the USSR Foreign Ministry.

In July 1950, at a meeting in Jerusalem of Israeli diplomatic representatives abroad, the question of the prospects for Jewish immigration from the Soviet Union was discussed, Foreign Minister Sharett spoke. He reported on a conversation with Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Y. Malik. To the question: "Can the USSR allow the immigration to Israel of 50-100 thousand Soviet Jews?" he replied with a joke: “What will America say about the arrival of such a group of Soviet citizens in Israel?” Although Sharett believed that "the situation of the Jews in the USSR is very difficult," he spoke out "against the conduct of explicit agitation in Israel for immigration." The most expedient, in his opinion, would be to negotiate on this issue with the Soviet government.

The issue of repatriation was also discussed at the beginning of November 1950 at a meeting of the Israeli and Soviet foreign ministers. A. Vyshinsky noted that "there are no Jews in the USSR who would like to repatriate <...> the issuance of exit visas contradicts the very essence of the Soviet system." Initially, in this matter, the Israeli authorities mainly concerned the relatives of diplomats and the problem of separated families who escaped destruction during the Second World War. At a meeting with Israel's envoy to the USSR, Sh. Elyashiv (Friedman) in July 1951, Gromyko said that this issue was "extremely complicated and serious." Elyashiv, in turn, remarked: "A positive solution to this issue will cause a wave of sympathy for you in Israel." Gromyko pointed to cases of "positive resolution of the issue" and stated that "there is every reason for the normal development of relations."

The main task of the State of Israel is the return of the Jews to their historical homeland <...> In this regard, the Government of the State of Israel appeals to the Soviet Union to provide those who wish it with the opportunity to resettle from the Soviet Union to Israel.

In April 1952, a draft note addressed to the Deputy Prime Minister of the USSR V. M. Molotov “On the departure of citizens of the USSR to Israel for permanent residence” was presented:

In pursuance of the instruction not to interfere with the departure of citizens of the USSR - Jews to Israel for permanent residence <...> in 1952, 6 applications were submitted with a request for permission to leave for Israel <...> Decisions on these applications have not yet been taken <...>

It follows from the document that during the period from 1948 to 1951, 65 applications were submitted, many of them were negatively resolved, the commission on departures under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks was instructed to “consider these cases again and allow departure to Israel, if by that there will be no special obstacles.”

On February 23, 1952, under the heading “Sov. secretly" Gromyko, in a note sent to Stalin, reported that "not for the first time" the Israeli government had raised the question of allowing Jews to leave the USSR for Israel before the Soviet government:

The USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs considers it expedient to instruct the USSR envoy to Israel comrade Ershov to give an answer on the merits of this issue to Israeli Foreign Minister Sharett <...> comrade Ershov must point out that the statement of this issue contained in the statement of the Israeli government of December 8, 1951 is essentially an interference in the internal affairs of the USSR.

The Political Report of the USSR Mission in Israel for 1951 noted:

The hostile attitude of the Israeli government towards the USSR will continue to grow, and it is possible that the Israelis may enter into a political conflict with us, using as a pretext the question of the immigration of Jews from the USSR to Israel.

Another irritant for the USSR was the speeches of the press. On May 25, 1951, Ershov, in his presentation to Sharett, pointed out attacks "against the head of the Soviet government, I. V. Stalin, the Soviet mission and the Soviet envoy." He concluded that "the government of Israel intends to put up with this slander and is unwilling to take any steps to stop it."

Even before the terrorist attack in February 1953, there were problems with the security of Soviet diplomats. In September 1948, unknown people disabled the car of the Soviet envoy and tore off the national flag of the USSR. On July 11, 1950, Ershov sent a telegram to the USSR Foreign Ministry, in which he reported that the Soviet mission had received a letter with "a warning that if Russia and its satellites do not give their Jews the right to immigrate to Israel <...> then the mission will be blown up." About this letter Ershov sent a telegram to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel. In his response, Sharett said that "we are dealing with an unbalanced subject" and "in order to prevent possible incidents, an instruction was given to the relevant authorities to strengthen the security of the USSR mission."

Relations remained tense throughout 1952. On October 19, in a telegram sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, A. N. Abramov, Charge d'Affaires of the USSR, pointed out a sharp change in the policy of the Israeli authorities, hostile to the Soviet Union, and asked if it would not be better to "postpone" a little with the arrival of the envoy "and at the same time make it clear to the Israelis about the abnormality in relations between the USSR and Israel through the fault of the latter.

The bomb explosion in the courtyard of the Soviet diplomatic mission on February 9, 1953 was more likely the reason: the reasons for the decision of the USSR to terminate diplomatic relations with Israel were more solid.

Bomb explosion: reason or reason for ending a relationship?

As a result of the explosion, three embassy employees were injured and the mission building was damaged. On the same day, February 9, the Israeli government issued a statement that it was "outraged by this criminal attempt." It was stated that "every effort will be made to detect criminals who will immediately be brought to justice upon arrest and will suffer the deserved punishment." On February 10, the Israeli Foreign Ministry sent a similar note to the Soviet mission. Prime Minister Ben-Gurion made a statement to the Knesset about the bombing, a crime he called "an abomination committed in Israel."

On February 12, USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Ya. Vyshinsky received Israel's envoy to the USSR, Sh. Elyashiv, and handed him a note from the Soviet government. It noted that Israel's statements of apology were "a fake game aimed at covering up the traces of a crime committed against the Soviet Union." The note pointed to the provocative nature of the articles and speeches in the Knesset by representatives of the ruling parties and members of the Israeli government. In particular, attention was drawn to the speech of January 19 by Minister of Foreign Affairs M. Sharett, "openly inciting hostile actions against the Soviet Union." The terrorist act that took place, the note pointed out, testifies to the absence in Israel of elementary conditions for the normal diplomatic activity of representatives of the Soviet Union.

 

The Soviet government also demanded from the Israeli side that "the personnel of the Mission immediately leave the borders of the Soviet Union."

On February 20, 1953, the Israeli mission left the USSR. On the same day, the Soviet mission also left for its homeland. A TASS correspondent and a Sovexportfilm representative were recalled from Israel. The interests of Israel in the USSR agreed to represent the government of the Netherlands. The government of Bulgaria took upon itself the protection of the interests of the Soviet Union in that country.

For their part, the closest allies of the USSR: Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia also declared their readiness to break off relations with Israel. The governments of these countries immediately reported this to Moscow. In the note of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Y. Malik, addressed to I. Stalin, it was noted:

Moscow considers it inappropriate to back this up with a joint statement by our friendly countries <…> This issue should not be linked <…> with the termination of diplomatic relations with Israel. The issue of continuing diplomatic relations with Israel should be considered depending on the state and taking into account the specific conditions of these relations.

Further developments indicated that the resumption of contacts between Soviet and Israeli diplomats in the missions of Eastern European countries already in April-July 1953 played a role in the restoration of diplomatic relations between the countries.

Reaction in Israel and the USSR

Israel did not receive any warnings or statements either through diplomatic channels or through the Soviet media about the severance of relations. This decision was seen as a serious and unexpected development of the political process with alarming consequences for the Jews in the Soviet Union, which could negatively affect Israel's position in the international arena. Ben-Gurion, speaking in the Knesset, noted that the government took this statement "with serious concern." Most of the politicians of the left camp believed that the reaction of the Israeli government to the "doctors' case" and the anti-Semitic campaign in the USSR should be more restrained.

A number of observers drew attention to the anti-Soviet sentiments that prevailed at that time in Israel, and pointed out that they were a reaction to the anti-Semitic trial in Prague and the "doctors' case" in the USSR. They asked if even then, even before the Soviet decision, Israel had intended to break off relations. Sharett stated that the Israeli government had no such intentions, since "the severance of diplomatic relations is not the path leading to peace."

On January 13, 1953, immediately following the reports in the Soviet press about the "doctors' case", a telegram from the Director General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, W. Eitan, to Israeli diplomatic representatives in Western countries and Yugoslavia stated:

So far, no Israeli representative should make official statements on this matter <…> Israel is not interested in entering into an open conflict with Soviet Russia, since it is vital for us to keep intact <…> our positions in Moscow <…>

Nevertheless, the “Doctors' Plot” put an end to the political restraint of the Israeli leadership. On January 19, in the Knesset, Sharett declared:

The Israeli government has always regarded friendly relations with the Soviet Union as one of the foundations of its international position and has highly valued their significance for the entire Jewish people. It is watching with deep regret and concern the officially launched anti-Semitic slander campaign in the Soviet Union <…> The Israeli Government will stigmatize the persecution of the Jewish people at the UN and from any other tribune <…> The Israeli Government will more vigorously seek the right to repatriation for all Jews whose hearts longing for Zion.

Probably, these statements also influenced the decision to break off relations. And one more circumstance could not but cause a negative reaction of the Soviet Union. In a note to Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Vyshinsky, Deputy Heads of the Department for the Near and Middle East of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs A. Shchiborin and S. Bazarov reported on the threat of Israeli statesmen to raise the question of "anti-Semitism in the USSR and in the countries of people's democracy" in the UN and that The Western press writes: the USSR intends to break off relations with Israel soon. They considered it "expedient <...> to publish an article in a central newspaper giving a rebuke to the defenders of killer doctors." At the same time, the authors of the note considered “it is undesirable to take any steps of a diplomatic nature with regard to Israel <...> one would have to wait and see what the hype will result in,

Obviously, the Israeli leadership did not expect the Soviet Union to sever diplomatic relations. After all, despite the then acute ideological confrontation between the USSR and Yugoslavia, diplomatic relations were maintained with this country. Even at the height of the Cold War, the USSR did not threaten to break off relations with the United States, Great Britain, and other countries. The rupture of relations between countries that are not at war with each other was considered an unusual and exceptional phenomenon in the system of international relations. It became clear that the attitude of the Soviet Union towards Israel was determined by a different standard than its attitude towards other countries.

The break in diplomatic relations was not only the reaction of the USSR to the policy of the Israeli government. He was connected with the internal policy of the Soviet authorities - the desire to put an end to Israel's persistent attempts to establish direct contacts with Soviet Jews and create organizations for their immigration.

Stalin's death on March 5, 1953, and the April 4 announcement of the innocence of Kremlin doctors arrested on trumped-up charges, testified to major changes in policy, including on the Jewish question. Opportunities have opened up for the speedy restoration of diplomatic relations.

"The Soviet government declares its desire to have friendly relations with Israel"

On April 4, Sharett stated that "his country would welcome the restoration of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union." The Israeli Foreign Ministry spokesman said in a statement:

The Government of Israel hopes that the correction of the perversions committed will result in an end to the anti-Jewish campaign and will welcome the restoration of normal relations between the USSR and Israel.

The Israeli government, through diplomatic and other channels, tried to find out the attitude of the USSR to the question of restoring relations. On April 10, 1953, at a reception at the Hungarian embassy in Bulgaria, Israel's charge d'affaires in this country, B. Razin, in a conversation with the Soviet ambassador M. Bodrov, noted "the courage shown by the Soviet government and expressed the hope that all problems would be resolved soon." He told the ambassador that it made sense to restore relations. According to the Polish ambassador to Bulgaria, Razin said that "the Israeli government is looking for a way to turn to the Soviet government with a proposal to restore normal diplomatic relations." Israeli diplomats continued their contacts primarily with the Soviet ambassador to Bulgaria. He was reminded of the statement of the USSR mission in Tel Aviv on February 10, 1953, as well as deep regret and apology for the crime against the Soviet mission. They reported that

there is no military pact between Israel and any other power <...> Israel has no hostile intentions towards the USSR, and under no circumstances will it take part in aggressive plans or actions against the USSR <...> The government highly appreciates the statement government of the USSR about its readiness to maintain in the future, as in the past, the friendly attitude towards Israel, which was shown during the period of the creation of Israel, and for its part seeks to reciprocate.

According to the Israeli envoy to Bulgaria and Hungary, G. Avner, "the fundamental decision (of the USSR on the restoration of relations. - A.L. ) was made in March or mid-April." In mid-May, the Bulgarian embassy, ​​which represented the interests of the Soviet Union in Israel, announced that Israel itself should take the initiative and send a letter with a proposal to resume diplomatic relations. On July 6, 1953, Foreign Minister Sharett sent a letter to Foreign Minister Molotov stating:

The Government of Israel officially invites the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to restore normal diplomatic relations, which were interrupted on February 12, 1953.

Israel reaffirmed its assurances that it would not be a party to any alliance or agreement pursuing aggressive goals against the USSR. In a reply letter to Sharett dated July 15, V. Molotov reported:

The Soviet government, for its part, also declares its desire to have friendly relations with Israel and considers it possible to restore diplomatic relations with the government of Israel.

On July 17, 1953, simultaneously in Moscow and Jerusalem, a message was made public about the restoration of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Sh. Elyashiv was again appointed Israel's envoy to the USSR. On December 14, he presented his credentials to the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR K. E. Voroshilov. On August 4, A. N. Abramov was appointed envoy of the USSR to Israel.

Nevertheless, the restoration of diplomatic relations did not eliminate the existence of serious problems between the countries. The USSR, as before, was concerned about close cooperation between Israel and the United States. Israel did not remove the issue of the departure of Soviet Jews from the agenda.

During the Six Day War, the Soviet Union again severed diplomatic relations with Israel. On June 10, 1967, the USSR announced that "in view of the continued aggression by Israel against the Arab states," the government of the USSR decided to break off diplomatic relations with Israel.

The restoration of diplomatic relations in 1953 did not lead to a noticeable improvement in mutual understanding between the countries. "Correct, but cool" - this is how Gromyko characterized these relations. Differences in the positions of the USSR and Israel took place against the backdrop of the ongoing Cold War and confrontation between the USSR and the USA. Israel actively advocated the emigration of Soviet Jews, strengthened military-political and economic cooperation with Western countries. For the Soviet authorities, Israel's policy was not only an external irritant, but also a significant internal factor that undermined the communist idea of ​​the "most just system" created in the USSR.

Such activity could not be acceptable for the Soviet Union, which supported the Arab states in the conflict with Israel. In general, Israeli-Soviet relations in the conditions of the Cold War, due to the peculiarities of Israel's policy, as well as the ideologies and socio-political structure prevailing in the two countries, had no prospects. Political relations were at a low level, and economic ties were practically non-existent. Nevertheless, after their restoration in the summer of 1953, diplomatic relations continued for almost 14 years. The Soviet Union was interested in maintaining its diplomatic presence in Israel. In turn, the Israeli leadership, in an effort to maintain ties with the USSR, largely proceeded from the fact that the Soviet Union had one of the largest Jewish communities in the world.

The article uses the following sources, including archival documents: Russian State Archive of Social and Political History. Fund 17 /Central Committee of the CPSU/; Archive of foreign policy of the Russian Federation. Fund 87 /Referentor of the Department of the Near and Middle East of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs/, Fund 089 /Referentor of the Department of the Near and Middle East of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Israel; State Archive of the Russian Federation/, Fund R-6991 /Council for Religious Affairs under the Council of Ministers of the USSR/, Fund R-9518 /Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries under the Council of Ministers of the USSR/, Fund R-8114 /Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee/; Sat. Soviet-Israeli relations. T. 1. 1941–1953. Book. 1. 1941- May 1949; Book. 2. Jews in the modern world; History of the Jews in Modern and Modern Times: An Anthology of Documents. T. I, II. Moscow, Jerusalem: Bridges of Culture, 2006; P. Sudoplatov. Memoirs: Intelligence and the Kremlin. Notes of an unwanted witness. M.: LLP Geya, 1996; G. Meir. My life. Autobiography. In 2 books. Jerusalem, 1989.

Source: https://lechaim.ru/academy/sovetskiy-soyuz-i-izraily-ot-priznaniya-do-razriva-diplomaticheskih-otnosheniy-1948-1953/